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THE TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT-PROBLEMS
IN FEDERAL COURT
by Kenneth H. Molberg

Prompted by dissatisfaction with the court-created concept that the state
may not be sued without its consent, and a desire to "do justice" to victims of
governmental tort, many states have either abrogated or modified the harsh
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.' Founded upon the premise
that "The King can do no wrong,"'2 this 16th-century English doctrine3 was
exported intact to the colonies where it was applied to an extent never
realized in England. 4 Although its broad application in this country has been
justified "on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends," 5
somewhat less ephemeral and perhaps more practical reasons have been
given for the concept's great vitality in the United States.6 The short-lived
abrogation of sovereign immunity in Chisholm v. Georgia,7 based on interpretation of the judiciary article of the Constitution, s led to the hurried
1. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1973), which
abolished the doctrine in Pennsylvania, lists the positions of all the states with regard to
sovereign immunity. The list is based on a compilation of cases from RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A, at 12-20 (Tent. Draft, 1973). The compilation reveals that
twenty-five jurisdictions have abrogated the doctrine, eighteen by judicial action and
seven by legislation. Three states, Connecticut, South Carolina and Texas, have modified
the doctrine, while another fifteen find a waiver of immunity where the governmental
unit carries insurance. Apparently only seven jurisdictions have retained the doctrine in
its common law form. 305 A.2d at 889. The typical view of the doctrine by today's
courts is expressed in the following: " '[S]overeign immunity' may be a proper subject
for discussion by students of mythology but finds no haven or refuge in this Court."
Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 284, 316 P.2d 582, 585
(1957).
2. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971). See also F.
POLLOCK AND F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 181-83 (2d ed. 1911). The maxim
that the King can do no wrong has been misunderstood. The English Kings did not enjoy
absolute immunity. In fact, the maxim may have meant just the opposite, in the sense
that the King was not allowed to do wrong. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 199 (1965).
3. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 131, at 970-71. Some trace the doctrine to
Roman law. See, e.g., Parker, The King Does No Wrong-Liability for Misadministration, 5 VAND. L. REV. 167 (1962); WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT 1-4 (1927).
4. Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reforms,
20 A.B.A.J. 747 (1934).
5. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (per Holmes, J.).
6. See, e.g., WATKINS, supra note 3, at 52-54 (heavy public debts). "The
rationale behind the doctrine of sovereign immunity is the protection of the states' fiscal
integrity." Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
1996, 44 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1975). Without question, the doctrine is perceived as a means
for protecting the state treasury from assault. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
663 (1974); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731,
738 (1947). See generally C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY (1972).
7. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). In Chisholm, the Court allowed suit against the
state by a South Carolina citizen.
8. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority. . . to Controversies. . . between a State and Citizens of
another State .... " U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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proposal and ratification of the eleventh amendment, 9 thus giving a constitutional status to this "gaslight of another time."' 10
As was the case in most states, the doctrine of sovereign immunity came
early to Texas" and existed with minor variation until only recently. When
bringing suit against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions, a Texas
plaintiff was faced with two major obstacles. First, the general rule of
sovereign immunity, that the state may not be sued without its consent,
barred the maintenance of his action.' 2 Secondly, even if consent were
present, the plaintiff could not recover in tort because the state was not liable
for the negligent acts or omissions of its agents or employees under the
principle of respondeat superior.'3 Not all actions were barred by the
9. "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amendment applies with
equal force to suits against states by their own citizens. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974).
10. Caporossi v. Atlantic City, 220 F. Supp. 508, 518 (D.N.J. 1963), a! 'd, 328 F.2d
620 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 825 (1964). With regard to the Chisholm decision
and the subsequent ratification of the eleventh amendment, it has been said that two
basic mistakes were made. First, the Court erred in interpreting art. III, § 2 as effecting
abolition of states' sovereign immunity. The framers of the Constitution never expected
the judiciary article to have such an effect. Second, those who sought to overturn
Chisholm by resort to constitutional amendment erred in basing the amendment on the
judiciary article. Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 Hous. L. REV.
1, 7-15 (1967). The contention that the framers of art. III, § 2 intended the states to
retain sovereign immunity is borne out by debate surrounding the article. See, e.g., 3 J.
ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 527, 553, 555-56 (2d ed. 1901). But
see C. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 40. Thus it seems logical to conclude that the amendment
was proffered simply to restate the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. See,
e.g., Comment, State Sovereign Immunity: No More King's X?, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 100,
104 (1973).
The impact of the doctrine has not merely been with regard to suits against the
sovereign. It has been suggested that the doctrine helps explain American government's
negative attitude toward public-sector collective bargaining. K. HANSLOWE, THE
EMERGING LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 11-20 (1967).
11. The case generally cited as establishing the doctrine in Texas is Hosner v.
DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764 (1847), where the court declared that "no State can be sued in her
own courts without her consent." Id. at 769. Immunity of the sovereign was apparently
unquestioned, for the court cited no authority for the proposition. The first reported case
recognizing the doctrine is Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
12. See, e.g., Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764 (1847). See also Texas-Mexican Ry. v.
Jarvis, 80 Tex. 456, 15 S.W. 1089 (1891); Mosheim v. Rollins, 79 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1935, writ dism'd).
13. Texas Highway Dep't v. Weber, 147 Tex. 628, 219 S.W.2d 70 (1949); State v.
Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731 (1941); State v. Isbell, 127 Tex. 399, 94 S.W.2d 423
(1936); accord; Davis v. State, 30 Idaho 137, 163 P. 373 (1917); Riddock v. State, 68
Wash. 329, 123 P. 450 (1912); Houston v. State, 98 Wis. 481, 74 N.W. 111 (1898); see
Greenhill & Murto, Governmental Immunity, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 462 (1971); Comment, The Governmental Immunity Doctrine in Texas-An Analysis and Some Proposed
Changes, 23 Sw. L.J. 341, 342 (1969); Comment, Governmental Immunity from Suit
and Liability in Texas, 27 TExAs L. REV. 337 (1949).
In determining when an action was one against the state, the test generally accepted by
the Texas courts followed closely the test enunciated in Ford Motor Co. v. Department
of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945): "[Wlhen the action is in essence one for the
recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest, and
is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are
nominal defendants." 323 U.S. at 464; see A.F. of L. v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1945, no writ). A somewhat broader test was also utilized by the
Texas courts. In San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Board of Educ., 108 S.W.2d 445 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937, no writ), it was said that "a suit against an officer or
department or agency of the state, the purpose or effect of which is to impose liabilities
upon, or enforce liabilities against, the state, is in effect a suit against the state, and
therefore cannot be maintained without the consent of the sovereign, expressed through
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doctrine; however, these did not sound in tort. 14 Governmental immunity
from suit in Texas, like in other states, extended to political subdivisions,
such as counties and municipalities.' 5 With regard to the latter, however, the
courts created the nebulous governmental-proprietary distinction which allowed the imposition of tort liability against a city from accidents arising out
of its performance of a proprietary function.'6
Although legislative attempts had been made as early as 1957 to
eliminate, at least in part, the rigors of the sovereign immunity doctrine in
Texas,'1 7 they were largely unsuccessful until 1969. In that year the Texas
Tort Claims Act was enacted,' 8 substantially modifying this "Loch Ness
Monster of the tort system."' 9
It is not the purpose here, however, to detail the state court decisions
interpreting and applying the Act. Rather, the purpose is to view two unique
problems a claimant under the Act will face when attempting to maintain
suit in federal court in Texas based on diversity of citizenship, namely,
whether the scope of the immunity waiver under the Act permits maintenance of actions in federal court, and if so, whether such actions can be
based on diversity jurisdiction.
I.

THE TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT

Section 4 of the Act provides that to the extent liability is created under
section 3, "immunity of the sovereign to suit, as heretofore recognized and
practiced in the State of Texas with reference to units of government, is
hereby expressly waived and abolished .... -20 Section 3 limits the extent
legislative action." 108 S.W.2d at 448. See also Griffin v. Hawn, 161 Tex. 422, 341
S.W.2d 151 (1960). Tort claims were no exception. State v. Isbell, 127 Tex. 399, 94
S.W.2d 423 (1936).
14. The exceptions to the immunity doctrine in Texas are set out in Comment, The
Governmental Immunity Doctrine in Texas-An Analysis and Some Proposed Changes,
27 Sw. L.J. 341, 342 (1969); Comment, Governmental Immunity from Suit and Liability
in Texas, 27 TExAs L. REv. 337 (1949).
15. Waco v. Landingham, 138 Tex. 156, 157 S.W.2d 631 (1941): Harris County v.
Gerhart, 115 Tex. 449, 283 S.W. 139 (1926); see Greenhill & Murto, note 13 supra.
16. See, e.g., Tyler v. Ingram, 139 Tex. 600, 164 S.W.2d 516 (1942); Meska v. City
of Dallas, 429 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd). The question of
when a municipality is performing a governmental function as opposed to a proprietary
one is perplexing and is the subject of much discussion in its own right. For this reason,
no attempt will be made to deal with the question here. But for the results of some
attempts by Texas courts to distinguish between the two, see Greenhill, Should Governmental Immunity for Torts be Re-examined, and, If So, by Whom?, 31 TExAs B.J. 1036,
1065-66 (1968). See also Doddridge, Distinction Between Governmental and Proprietary
Functions of Municipal Corporations, 23 MICH. L. REv. 325 (1925). One writer has
defined proprietary function as "a term meaning those functions for which appellate
courts think municipalities ought to be liable." Smith, Insurance and the Texas Tort
Claims Act, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 445, 447 n.5 (1971). It should be noted that the
distinction still plays an important role in suits against Texas municipalities. See notes
26-28 infra and accompanying text.
17. The history of attempts to enact tort claims legislation in Texas, as wellas the
history surrounding the present Act, are detailed in Kronzer, The New Texas Tort
Claims Act-Some Offhand Reflections, 4 TEXAS TRIAL LAw. F. 11 (NovemberDecember 1969) (pt. 1), and 4 TEXAs TRIAL LAw. F. 21 (January-February 1970) (pt.
2). See also Greenhill & Murto, note 13 supra.
18. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
19. Kronzer, supra note 17, at 12 (pt. 1).
20. Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 4 (1970).
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of waiver by making governmental units liable for property damage, personal injury or death caused by the negligence of any officer or employee of the
state where he would be liable under general principles of tort law, provided
such officer or agent is acting within the scope of his employment and the
accident arises "from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle" or
"motor-driven equipment."' 21 Further, units of government are liable for
premise defects to the extent a private person would be liable therefor,22
although the duty owed by the unit is limited to that owed by a private
2
individual to a licensee. 3
Additionally, the Act restricts the amount of money damages available 24
and prohibits awards of punitive damages. 25 Among the other exceptions
and limitations 26 provided for is that the Act does not apply to the
proprietary functions of cities, 27 which means that these units will not enjoy
28
limited liability when performing such functions.
II.

PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL COURT

Although the Act makes governmental units liable for their negligence in
certain cases, and thereby accords legal protection to victims of governmental
torts similar to that accorded victims of private torts, the plaintiff in a
diversity suit will nevertheless find that he must deal with the revered
position of the states when in federal court.
A.

Scope of Waiver and the FloresApproach

As a general proposition a state may, though effecting a waiver of its
immunity from suit, restrict that waiver to state courts.2 9 In determining
whether the State of Texas or its units of government may be sued in federal
court under the Tort Claims Act, two of the Act's sections have commanded
21. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.art. 6252-19, § 3 (Supp. 1975), amending TEx. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (1970). Accidents caused from motor driven
equipment used in the operation of floodgates or water release equipment by river
authorities are exempted. Id. The term "units of government" as employed in the Act is
all-encompassing. Id. § 2(1) (1970).
22. Id. § 3 (Supp. 1975).
23. Id. § 18(b) (1970). This limitation of duty does not apply if payment has been
made for the use of the defective premises or if the duty owed by the unit of government
in the first instance is one to warn of special defects on highways or streets, or the
absence, condition or malfunction of certain warning devices. Id. Damage to property is
not compensable under that portion of section 3 which deals with premise defects. Id. § 3
(Supp. 1975).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 19A (Supp. 1975),
amending TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 19A (1970) which exempts school
and junior college districts from the Act except as to motor vehicles. Most exemptions
are provided for, however, in § 14 of the Act.
27. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 18(a) (1970).
28. See note 16 supra.
29. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946),
citing Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), and Great N.
Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944). Whether such a proposition is valid, or
whether it conflicts with some seemingly well-settled notions about federal subject-matter
jurisdiction and the relationship between state and federal laws in general, will be
discussed below. See notes 51-95 infra and accompanying text.
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most of the courts' attention. Section 7 in part provides that "[t]he laws and
the statutes of the State of Texas and the Rules of Civil Procedure . . .
insofar as applicable and to the extent that such rules are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to and govern all actions brought
under the provisions of this Act."130 Section 5 calls for venue3 of suits to lie in
the county in which the cause of action or part thereof arose. 1
The first case involving the question of whether Texas had consented to
suit in federal court, Weaver v. Hirsty,"2 arose nearly three years after the
effective date of the Act.' 3 The plaintiffs, residents of Michigan, were
injured in an automobile collision with defendant, a Texas resident. The
defendant impleaded the Texas Highway Commission seeking indemnity or
contribution on the grounds that THC's negligent surfacing of the highway
contributed to the plaintiff's injury. The Commission moved to dismiss,
contending that the impleader action could not be maintained in federal
court because THC had not consented to suit there. In granting the motion
the court relied on sections 5 and 7 of the Act and summarily concluded "that
the legislature of Texas did not intend by passage of the Tort Claims Act to
34
consent to be sued in federal court.'
Shortly thereafter a federal district court pointed to some fundamental
oversights in the Weaver opinion. The court in Flores v. Norton & Ramsey
Lines, Inc. 5 flatly declared that it "respectfully . . . disagrees with the

reasoning in the Weaver case and declines to follow it."' 36 Like Weaver,
Flores involved impleader, this time of the Texas Department of Public
Safety. The plaintiff's vehicle had been struck from the rear by the defendant's truck after the plaintiff had been directed to stop by a DPS officer who
failed to make proper provision for removing the plaintiff's vehicle from the
highway. Rejecting the contention that sections 5 and 7 of the Act indicated
a legislative intent to restrict suits to state tribunals, the court said:
Section 5 of the Act commanding that suit be instituted in the county
in which the cause of action arose merely relates to venue. It is inconceivable that the Texas Legislature intended to limit suits in federal court under the Act by that language. Finally, the application of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to the Act in Section 7 does so
'insofar as applicable.'

In federal court the Texas Rules .

.

. are

clearly not applicable and the language used could be construed as a
recognition of that fact .... 37
Additionally, the court reasoned that if the state legislature had intended to
restrict the scope of waiver "it could have easily stated so in Section 4 or in
8
Section 14, where numerous exceptions to liability are set out.'
30. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 7 (1970) (emphasis added).
31. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 5 (1970).
32. No. 5513 (E.D. Tex., Nov. 22, 1972).
33. The Act became effective Jan. 1, 1970. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19,
§ 22 (1970).
34. Weaver v. Hirsty, No. 5513, at 3 (E.D. Tex., Nov. 22, 1972).
35. 352 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Tex. 1972), noted in 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 152 (1973).
36. 352 F. Supp. at 153.
37. Id. (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
38. 352 F. Supp. at 153.
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Slightly more than a month later a third U.S. district court encountered the
same problem in Lester v. County of Terry, 39 and, deciding what it thought
was a question of first impression, reached the same result as Flores. In
Lester, however, only the section establishing venue in the county where the
cause of action arose was urged to bar suit in federal court. In response to
this contention the court concluded that to accept such an argument "would
. . . create the anomaly that a county could be sued in federal court only
where the cause of action happened to arise in a county in which . . . a
federal district court . . . sit[s].' ' 4 Such a result was termed "unaccepta-

ble and certainly contrary to legislative intent."' 41 Lester also questioned the
proposition that a state could defeat federal court jurisdiction consistently
with the supremacy clause by limiting the scope of waiver to state courts
where -the federal court requisites of diversity and amount are present. 42 The
case thus became the first of those dealing with scope of waiver under the
Act to impliedly suggest that a new look should be taken at the holdings
which have established that a state may limit the applicability of its consent
to courts of its own creation.
By failing to deal more fully with these various considerations, however,
Lester was simply another Weaver with a different result. Flores, on the
other hand, though not questioning the proposition that a state may restrict
the scope of its waiver, provided the most thorough interpretation to date of
whether or not the Texas Legislature did in fact intend to restrict the scope
of consent to suit with regard to forum. In a footnote, the Flores court
correctly pointed out that to read the venue section of the Act as an
indication that the legislature intended to restrict suits to state courts would
not be in keeping with authority which holds that similar venue provisions of
other acts generally have not been interpreted to preclude suit in federal
court. 43 Undoubtedly, the backbone of Flores is its reasonable interpretation
of sections 5 and 7 and its recognition that there is indeed an ambiguity with
respect to the scope of waiver. Accordingly, grasping the section 13 provision
which mandates that the Act shall receive a liberal construction, the court
44
found that any ambiguity should be construed in favor of the claimant.
Moreover, two policy arguments had some bearing on the question of
whether waiver is complete under 'the Act. First, the Flores result would
eliminate multiplicity of actions where there is more than one defendant who
cannot rely on sovereign immunity. 45 Had the case against the 'Department
of Public Safety been dismissed it would have had the undesirable effect of
39. 353 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Tex. 1973), a/I'd, 491 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1974) (no
reference to the present question).
40. 353 F. Supp. at 172.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 171-72.
43. 352 F. Supp. at 153 n.lla, citing the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act,
TEx. REV. Civ STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967), and Ellis v. Associated Indus. Ins.
Corp., 24 F.2d 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 649 (1928). Cf. Reagan v. Farmers
Loan &Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894).

44. Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150, 156 (W.D. Tex.
1972).
45. Id. at 153.
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forcing any continued action against the DPS into a state court, while the
action against the other defendants could have proceeded in the federal
tribunal. Secondly, the Flores decision preserves the diverse plaintiff's choice
of forum in a situation where his choice should receive protection.4 6 More
than one plaintiff's attorney would voice apprehension at the difficulties a
citizen from a different part of this country might face by bringing suit
against the State of Texas or one of its agencies in the courts of the state. Of
course, local prejudice is by no means unique to Texas. Whether such
prejudice would indeed result is by no means certain; however, such a fear
was instrumental in the creation of the concept of diversity jurisdiction. 47 In
addition, whether a fairer trial could be had in a federal district court within
the state is not beyond debate.
Perhaps a more fundamental question, one not considered heretofore,
should be raised and considered in determining whether consent under the
Act is complete. Whereas the preceding paragraphs have discussed the effect
upon the plaintiff, the present question requires an opposite approach,
namely: what prejudice would result to units of government in allowing the
maintenance of tort actions against them in federal court? Put another way,
what valid state purpose is served by restricting the scope of waiver when
tort claims are involved? 48 The tort cases are distinguishable from suits
brought against a state by a foreign corporation for the recovery of taxes. In
the latter situation a state has a valid interest in restricting controversies to
state court: efficient administration of specialized state tax schemes.4 9
However, the adjudication of tort claims would not require the special
knowledge of a state court. It could hardly be argued that a state court
possesses any greater competence with respect to applying and interpreting
tort law than does a federal court.
If the state has any interest in restricting waiver in the tort area, perhaps it
derives from the notion that potential verdicts would be larger in federal
court. However, section 3 of the Texas Tort Claims Act limits liability of
governmental units to compensatory damages to the extent of "$100,000 per
person and $300,000 for any single occurrence for bodily injury or death
and . . . $10,000 for any single occurrence for injury to or destruction of
property." 50 Presumably, the reasons that units of government argue that
46. Id.
47. The most generally accepted rationale was given by Chief Justice Marshall in
Bank of the United States v. Devaux, 2 U.S. (5Cranch) 61, 87 (1809):
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation . . . it is not less
true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this
subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision
of controversies . . . between citizens of different states.
See generally Phillips & Christenson, The Historical and Legal Background of the Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.J. 959 (1960).
48. While the question is raised in the context of the Texas Act, it is not for that
reason less applicable to any similar act of another state.
49. See cases cited infra notes 53-59.
50. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Supp. 1975), amending TEX. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (1970). Even in those states which impose no limit on

the amount of damages one may recover, it would still be questionable whether the

purpose so served by restricting consent could be termed "vali."
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they may be sued only in state court are a desire to forestall speedy
prosecution of actions or a hope to find a not-so-immune forum.
Questioning the Validity of the Premise. Since it is fairly well settled that a
state may limit the extent of its waiver to state courts, one might question the
propriety of challenging the proposition. It is asserted, however, that the
challenge should be made and the continued vitality of the maxim attacked.
Presently, the proposition that a state may limit the scope of waiver with
regard to the forum in which it may be sued has risen to a level that a
presumption arises that the state did not intend to consent to suit in federal
court unless there is a clear indication to the contrary. 5' Historically, the
view that a state may restrict its consent to suit dates from the turn of the
century.5 2 But three cases decided in the mid-1940's firmly established the
proposition, the opinion in each case being delivered by Mr. Justice Reed
and each being a suit for the recovery of taxes. In the first, Great Northern
Life Insurance Co. v. Read,53 the Court found that a suit to recover taxes
paid under protest by the plaintiff could not be maintained in federal court,
even though the general jurisdictional provision of the Oklahoma Act
allowing suit was framed in broad terms containing no indication that the
forum of suit was to be restricted. Nevertheless, the Court said that "when
we are dealing with the sovereign exemption from judicial interference in the
vital field of financial administration a clear declaration of the state's
intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than . . .

its own

• . . must be found."'54 The Court also recognized that the special procedures called for in the act would undoubtedly result in a different type of
judgment being given in federal court than in state court. 55
In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,56 the second of the three
decisions, the state statute provided that suit for the recovery of wrongfully
assessed taxes should be brought "in any court of competent jurisdiction; and
the circuit or superior court of the county in which the taxpayer resides
• . . shall have original jurisdiction . . . ,,57 Again the Court found no
clear indication that the state had consented -tosuit in federal court. 58 By the
time Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission,5 9 the last of the
51. Comment, Waiver of State Immunity to Suit with Special Reference to Suits in
FederalCourts, 45 MICH. L. REv. 348, 355 (1947).

52. The proposition probably had its firm origin in Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436
(1900), where the Court held that a California statute which provided for suit in a
specifically named court in Sacramento County showed an intent on the part of the
legislature to restrict suit to courts of the state. Four years later the same result was

reached in Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590 (1904), where the Court found that a
Michigan statute allowing tax suits against the state, which contained complex state

procedural provisions, was evidence of an intention on the part of the state to limit suits
to the courts of its creation.
53. 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
54. Id. at 54 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
55. 322 U.S. at 55.
56. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
57. Quoted id. at 465.

58. 323 U.S. at 465 (footnote omitted). The Court relied on Read for the proposition that "'it is not consonant with our dual system for the federal courts to be astute to
read . . . consent to embrace federal as well as state courts.'" 323 U.S. at 465, citing
Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944).
59. 327 U.S. 573 (1946).
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trilogy, reached the Court, there was ample precedent to rely upon in Read
and Ford Motor Co. 60 The Kennecott Court gave the reason for -the rule as
"the right of a State to reserve for its courts the primary consideration and
decision of its own tax litigation because of the direct impact of such
litigation upon its finances." 6'
Whereas the majority in all three cases took the view that consent to suit
in federal court must be clear, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a well-reasoned
dissent in Read took a different approach. While accepting the proposition
that a state may restrict the scope of its waiver, the state, he noted, had not
said it was doing so;62 moreover, no "restriction [is] indicated by practical
considerations in the administration of state affairs." 63 In his view, it would
make no difference in which court the state was sued:
Here the suit in a federal court would not supplant a specially adaptable
state scheme of administrationnor bring into play the expert knowledge
of a state court regarding local conditions. The subject matter and the
course of the litigation
6 4 in the federal court would be precisely the same
as in the state court.
In mechanistically applying this proposition to the tort area 5 the Court
has been guilty of ignoring several distinctions of importance. First, without
exception, the cases which established the proposition that a state may
restrict waiver to its own courts dealt with taxes in one form or another. 66
Secondly, and to varying extents, the opinions in Read, Ford Motor Co., and
Kennecott seemed concerned chiefly with interfering in what Mr. Justice
Frankfurter called "a specially adaptable state scheme of administration"
requiring the expertise of a state tribunal. 67 But perhaps most of all, the
opinions failed to discuss prior significant decisions of the Court which had
not assumed the proposition, or at least had not given it such broad
application.
Foremost among these delimiting opinions is Chicago & North Western
Railway v. Whitton, 8 a wrongful death action in which the Court held that
where a general legal right is conferred, it may be enforced by any federal
court within the state, provided the court has jurisdiction over the parties.6 9
This was said despite a provision in the particular act allowing suit only in a
court established under the laws of the state. In responding to this language
60. "Upon the question of the consent of Utah to suit . . . in the federal courts...
little needs to be added to our discussion in the Read and Ford Motor Co. Cases." Id. at
577.
61. Id.
62. Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 60 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id. (emphasis added). "Legislation giving consent to sue is not to be treated in
the spirit in which seventeenth century criminal pleading was construed." Id.
65. See, e.g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276-77
(1959) (dictum).
66. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
67. Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 60 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
68. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1872).
69. Id. at 286.
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the Court said: "[W]henever a general rule as to property or personal rights,
or injuries to either, is established by state legislation, its enforcement by a
Federal court in a case between proper parties is a matter of course, and the
jurisdiction of the court.

. .

is not subject to state limitation."' 70

One must conclude that the proposition that a state may restrict the scope
of its waiver with regard to forum is not as broad as might be suggested.
Rather, it is contended that when the federal courts say that a state may
qualify the forum in which suit against it will be maintained, despite the
mandates of federal jurisdictional statutes, they are merely seeking "to
refrain from interference with state policies." '71 In other words, it is simply a
matter of deference on the part of the courts to some unique local system of
legal administration which the state tribunals are better equipped to handle.
As is apparent, tort law does not fit this category. But by applying the
proposition to all types of actions, the lower courts and perhaps the Supreme
Court itself have confused the problem of the scope of consent with regard to
forum, on the one hand, with that of consent to be sued initially, on the
other. Only as to the latter should sovereign immunity be an issue. It is here
that the state makes the choice of retaining or foregoing such immunity, of
determining the extent of waiver as regards liability as opposed to the scope
of waiver as regards forum. The problem of forum of suit, therefore, is an
entirely different question, one not touching on immunity at all; for if there is
immunity from suit in the first instance there need be no inquiry as to
sufficiency of forum. The effect of retaining sovereign immunity would bar
suit in either arena; the effect of waiver would bar suit in neither. 72 As to
the extent of liability, or the limited extent of that liability as provided in the
Texas Tort Claims Act, a federal court would be bound to follow those
73
provisions in the same manner as would a state court.
Some Questions on Supremacy. Accepting for the moment the proposition
that a state may select the forum in which it shall be sued, an additional
consideration arises. The foregoing sentence speaks in terms of action on the
70. Id. Another such case, though not a tort action, is Reagan v. Farmers Loan &
Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894), a suit to enjoin enforcement of certain rates by the
Texas Railroad Commission, where the statute involved provided for suit to be brought
in a state court in Travis County, Texas. There the Court declared that "[g]iven a case
where a suit can be maintained in the courts of the state to protect property rights, a
citizen of another state may invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal courts." Id. at 391.
Accord, Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Interstate Constr. Co. v. Regents of the
University of Idaho, 199 F. 509 (D.C. Idaho 1912). See also Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 425, 430 (1869).
The Whitton case was distinguished in Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900), and the
general proposition it stated was held applicable to actions between private individuals.
Id. at 444. Also distinguished in Reeves were the Reagan and Smyth cases, which were
said not to have been suits against states, in that the relief sought was actually against
state officers who were about to take action hostile to the plaintiffs' rights. 178 U.S. at
444-45.
71. See Comment, supra note 51, at 358.
72. This could be termed the theory of "complete" waiver. It finds analogy in other
areas of the law of privileges and immunities, most notably in the privilege against selfincrimination situation, where the accused in a criminal proceeding, once choosing to
take the stand and tell his version of the story, may not invoke the privilege on crossexamination. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958); C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 148 (2d ed. 1972).
73. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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part of the state to limit the scope of its consent to courts of its own creation
when it has waived immunity. This is so because it is in such terms that the
courts have spoken when considering the amenability of a unit of government to suit in federal court.7 4 Yet it is difficult to understand how a state
may validly restrict the power of a federal court to entertain suit against it
once immunity has been waived, particularly when it is recognized that
federal diversity jurisdiction is self-executing or self-attaching in -the sense
that a party to a suit may not manipulate it at his will. 75 Besides indicating
that what federal courts must mean when saying that a state may restrict the
scope of waiver with regard to forum is that they are deferring to state
tribunals, the proposition also indicates that if it is to be taken at face value,
questions may arise under the supremacy clause of the Constitution. 7 This
becomes evident upon reviewing a few fundamental principles. Diversity
jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution 77 and is implemented through
federal statute. 78 'Like any other portion of the Constitution, or the laws
enacted in pursuance thereof, the provisions regarding diversity are obviously
deemed to be "the supreme Law of the Land."' 79 Without the special
doctrine of sovereign immunity, the state and its various units of government
would stand on the same footing as an individual. Such is the view in Texas
as espoused by its courts;80 such was the view of the legislature that enacted
the Texas Tort Claims Act. 8'
It seems anomalous, then, for a federal court to say that even though a
state has consented to be sued, thus placing itself in the position of an
individual,8 2 it may nevertheless deprive a federal court of jurisdiction to
hear suits to which it has consented, even if that jurisdiction is conferred by
the Constitution and laws of the United States.88 It has been held that other
portions of tort claims statutes must fall if not consonant with due process or
equal protection.8 4 Certainly provisions for federal diversity jurisdiction are
74. See cases cited at notes 53-59 supra.

75. See, e.g., Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312
U.S. 710 (1941).
76. 'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in

Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the

Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNSr. art.
VI, cl. 2.

77. Art. I1, § 2, quoted at note 8 supra.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
79. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
80. "The state is regarded as a private individual when it enters suit and entitled
. to enforce its asserted rights, and must, in like manner as an individual, answer for
any damages resulting from the wrongful procuring of the garnishment .... " Massachusetts v. Davis, 160 S.W.2d 543, 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 140 Tex. 398, 168 S.W.2d 216, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 210 (1943)
(emphasis added); accord, Texas Dep't of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 7-8

(Tex. 1974). See also State v. Jasco Aluminum Prods. Corp., 421 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1967, no writ); Reed v. State, 175 .S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1943, no writ).

81. See notes 145, 146 infra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 145, 146 infra and accompanying text.
83.

"It is elementary that what Congress constitutionally has given, the state may

not constitutionally take away." Local 232, UAW-AFL v. Wisconsin Employment

Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 254 (1949).
84. See, e.g., Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879 (Nev. 1973), where the Nevada

Supreme Court invalidated a notice-of-claim statute on due process and equal protection
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no less efficacious in -their sphere than the fourteenth amendment is in its
own. Perhaps the anomaly derives from an erroneous interpretation of the
eleventh amendment, 5 which is framed in terms of a limitation on the
power of the federal judiciary. History will reveal, however, that the
amendment was proposed and ratified simply to force recognition by the
federal courts of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. s6 The
framers and proponents of the amendment were surely not concerned with
such niceties as restricting the forum of suit; rather, what was abhorrent to
them was the principle that the state could be sued at all without its consent.
Indeed, in actions which had long been recognized as maintainable against
the sovereign, the courts realized that the forum of suit could not be
restricted. 7 It would be a difficult interpretation at best to say that the
amendment bars a federal court from hearing a suit to which the state has
consented. The preceding contentions are easily illustrated and clarified once
it is recognized that the eleventh amendment restates the classic doctrine of
sovereign immunity and is not a jurisdictional barrier.88 Thus, if it is valid to
say that a state, once having waived immunity, stands in no different relation
to the courts than does an individual, then there should be but -the following
consequence: "A state cannot by any statutory provisions withdraw from the
cognizance of the Federal courts a suit or judicial proceeding in which there
is . . . [a controversy between citizens of different states]. Otherwise the
purpose of the Constitution. . . would thereby be defeated."'8 9
grounds for the reason that the statute arbitrarily barred victims of governmental tort but
left unimpaired the rights of victims of private tort. Accord, Reich v. State Highway
Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972), where the notice provision of the
Michigan Tort Claims Act was held unconstitutional as a violation of due process and
equal protection. See also Salavea v. City and County of Honolulu, 517 P.2d 51 (Hawaii
1973).
85. See note 10 supra.
86. See notes 9, 10 supra; Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and
Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REv. 207 (1968). As previously noted, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity had been disregarded by the Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793); see notes 7-10 supra.
87. See, e.g., Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239,
252-53 (1905), a condemnation proceeding brought by the Traction Company under
Kentucky statutes relating to the condemnation of lands. When the state court refused to
allow the defendant to remove the proceeding to federal court, the defendant applied to a
federal circuit court for relief. The circuit court sustained its exercise of jurisdiction over
the controversy and the Supreme Court agreed, saying that a state has no ability to
withdraw a suit from the cognizance of a federal court where there is a controversy
between citizens of different states. "In the exercise of that power a circuit court of the
United States, sitting within the limits of a state and having jurisdiction of the parties, is,
for every practical purpose, a court of that state." Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
88. See note 10 supra. The Supreme Court has never forthrightly declared that the
amendment presents a traditional jurisdictional bar, since the concept of waiver would be
inconsistent therewith. See C. WRioHT,THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 7, at 15-16
(2d ed. 1970). The Court has said, however, that the amendment is quasi-jurisdictional,
in that it may be raised for the first time on appeal. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
677-78 (1974). At least one court has gone to the extreme by declaring that state
sovereign immunity is "a limitation . . . on the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the

federal courts." Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S.
Ct. 1996, 44 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1975).
89. Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 253
(1905). See also Moss v. Calumet Paving Co., 201 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D. Ind. 1962),
and cases there cited. The principle is recognized in Texas: "A State . . .cannot deprive
a federal instrumentality of one of its constitutional or statutory rights, and a federal
right cannot be defeated under the name of state practice." Langdeau v. Republic Nat'l
Bank, 161 Tex. 349, 356, 341 S.W.2d 161, 166 (1960).

[Vol. 29

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

Allowing a state that has otherwise consented to suit in effect to deny the
right of a federal court to entertain such a suit, when no provision in the
Constitution allows it to do so, bears a striking resemblance to the doctrine of
"dual federalism." 00 This doctrine was perceived in the mandate of the tenth
amendment and it "meant that states' rights somehow limited even the
expressly delegated national powers for some, but not for all, purposes."9 1
Even today, however, with the repudiation of the doctrine nearly forty years
in the past, its counterpart finds expression in cases arising under modern
tort claims statutes.
Texas Has Consented to Suit in Both State and Federal Court. With the
foregoing factors in mind it seems apparent that Texas has consented to suit
in federal as well as in state courts. First, accepting the proposition that a
state may restrict waiver with regard to forum, 92 it is evident that the Texas
Tort Claims Act did not do so. This much is clear when various sections of
the Act are analyzed in accordance with Flores.98 Secondly, the several
considerations that weighed heavily with the Supreme Court in finding a lack
of intent to submit to federal court in the tax cases necessarily are not
present in cases arising under the Act. It is hard to see how a federal court,
in the tort field particularly, would be forced to render a judgment different
from that which a state court would render. Nor in the tort area would the
court run the risk of interfering in the field of state financial administration
or with any unique state scheme which accompanies it. Additionally, no
specialized procedural requirements are found in the Act, and it cannot be
said that the course of the litigation would be any different in federal court.
Third, it would appear that section 3 of the Act,94 which places the state and
its governmental units on the same plane as individuals, would necessarily
preclude the state from contending that it has not consented to suit in federal
court. As was pointed out in Flores, other sections of the Act specifically set
out numerous exceptions,95 though restriction as to forum of suit is not one
of them. Finally, it is at least questionable whether once a state has set out
guidelines as to how it may be sued it may say where it can be sued
consistently with federal supremacy as established by the Constitution.
B.

The Diversity Statute: A New Basis for Sovereign Immunity?

The diversity statute provides that "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds . . .
$10,000 .

. and is between-(1) citizens of different States .

...",,6

The questions of whether a state has consented to suit, and only then
90. See W.

MENDELSON, THE CONSTrrUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT

94 (2d ed.

1965). This doctrine thrived during a period beginning with the 1890's and ending with
the latter part of the 1930's. Id.
91. Id. (emphasis in original).
92. See note 29 supra.
93. Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
94. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Supp. 1975), amending TEx. REv.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (1970).
95. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) (emphasis added).

COMMENTS

1975]

whether it has consented to .be sued in federal court, pose considerable
difficulty to the diverse plaintiff. However, an even greater barrier to the
maintenance of his action under the Texas Tort Claims Act is the federal
diversity statute, which, through judicial interpretation, has in effect acted as
a quasi-sovereign immunity statute at the federal level.
The principle proposition in this area is that a state is not a "citizen" for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, and as a corollary, neither is an agency of
the state which is merely its "arm or alter ego."' 97 The courts, however, have
not always been clear on the reasons for finding that a state or one of its
units lacks citizen status, and, unfortunately, they have many times confused
what are two distinct issues: (1) whether the unit of government being sued
stands in such a relation to the state in general that it may enjoy the benefit
of the latter's sovereign immunity; and (2) whether the unit has such a
distinct character relative to the state in general that it may be viewed as a
citizen for diversity purposes. 98
The principle that a state is not a citizen for diversity purposes derives
from the case of Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama,90 a suit brought by

the state in a state court. When the defendant made an effort to remove the
action to federal court, the Supreme Court denied it the right to do so
because "a suit between a State and a citizen . . . of another State is not
between citizens of different States. . . ."100 However, the case generally
relied on as stating the principle is State Highway Commission v. Utah

Construction Co.,' 01 involving breach of contract, where the commission was
held not to be a citizen for diversity purposes. 10 2 In so holding, the Court
stated that the commission, when entering the contract in question, "was but
the arm or alter ego of the State with no funds or ability to respond in dam-

ages." 0 3 The state, not the commission, was held to be the real party in
interest, and diversity vel non must be determined with reference to that
party.'

04

From the Wyoming case, then, has come the proposition that where it is
determined by the court that the unit of government sued is the arm or alter
ego of the state, or that the unit is not a separate one, distinct in some
manner from the state, the real party in interest will be said to be the state
itself.' 05 Of course, determining when a certain agency fits the above
97. See notes 99-105 inlra and accompanying text.

98. See DeLong Corp. v. State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7, 14 (D. Ore.
1964). While a determination of the first question may be made by resorting to
expressions of state authorities, or becomes irrelevant when the state has abrogated its
immunity, the second question is essentially one to be determined by a federal court and
does not become meaningless upon a state's giving its consent to suit. See, e.g., Louisiana
Highway Comm'n v. Farnsworth, 74 F.2d 910 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 729
(1935); White v. Umatilla County, 247 F. Supp. 918 (D. Ore. 1965).
99. 1.55 U.S. 482 (1894).
100. Id. at 487.
101. 278 U.S. 194 (1929).
102. While the case iscited as authority for that proposition, it isat best doubtful
whether itcan be said that its
holding was that broad. The highway department was not
named as the contracting party inthe original contract, the "State of Wyoming" was. 278
U.S. at 197-98.
103. 278 U.S. at 199 (emphasis added).
104. 278 U.S. at 199-200 (emphasis added).
105. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v.State Roads Comm'n, 187 F. Supp. 766 (D.Md.
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description is not always easy. However, it has been said that a state is the
real party in interest when a judgment rendered against one of its units must
be paid from state funds, or where the relief injures the state itself.106
Whether such a view proceeds from an overzealous fervor on the part of the
courts to protect states, or results from some unidentifiable "logical" progression of judicial thought, its effect has been to equate requisites regarding
diversity jurisdiction with concepts of sovereign immunity. So, one sees in
such cases the reasoning that since the state would ultimately bear 0the
7
burden, the suit is against the state and is therefore not maintainable.'
It is difficult to perceive how this test differs from that employed in
determining whether an agency of the state is cloaked with sovereign immunity, namely that when the action will result in the recovery of money
from the state, "the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual
officials are nominal defendants."'10 8 To enhance the confusion, it has been
held that a governmental unit, because it performs a traditionally governmental function, such as the operation of the highway system, is not a citizen
for diversity purposes. 10 9 Of course, the governmental-proprietary distinction
is uniquely applicable to the question of whether an agency is cloaked with
sovereign immunity. 11 0
It has been recognized that considerable confusion exists "in the authorities in failing to distinguish between jurisdiction under the diversity statute
and a claim of immunity,""' and perhaps because of such recognition there
has been somewhat of a departure from what was essentially one approach
to both issues. But while -the approach is different, the terminology will be
the same, so that "arm or alter ego," "separate and distinct entity," and "real
party in interest" are phrases which will still be employed.
Becoming a Citizen. Despite the blanket statements that neither a state nor a
unit thereof which is considered its arm or alter ego is a citizen for purposes
of diversity jurisdiction, it is possible, at least with regard to governmental
units, that the unit involved may have its disabilities removed and thus
become a "citizen," provided the unit possesses certain characteristics. In
other words, a state legislature may give such powers and duties to a unit of
government that the unit is taken from being a nonentity on the one hand, to
a citizen for diversity purposes on the other. Those factors which are taken
1960); John & Sal's Automotive Serv., Inc. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 165 F. Supp. 518
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); cases listed in Annot., 147 A.L.R. 786 (1943).
106. See, e.g., Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 41 F.
Supp. 175 (D. Ore. 1941).

107. This confusion is exemplified in Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. v. Oregon Liquor
Control Comm'n, 41 F. Supp. 175 (D. Ore. 1941), where, in determining whether the
unit involved in the suit was a citizen for diversity purposes, the court looked to who
would bear the payment in a judgment rendered against the commission.
108. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). See also

Harrison Constr. Co. v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 272 F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1959), and
note 13 supra and accompanying text.

109. See, e.g., Fowler v. California Toll-Bridge Authority, 128 F.2d 549 (9th Cir.
1942); Cargile v. New York Trust Co., 67 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 292
U.S. 625 (1934); notes 116-19 infra and accompanying text.
110. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
111. DeLong Corp. v. State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ore. 1964).
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into account by the courts in making the determination whether a certain
unit of government is a citizen or merely an arm of the state include, but are
by no means limited to: (1) whether the unit may sue or be sued; (2)
whether its overall character is quasi or publicly corporate; (3) whether the
unit has control over funds and their expenditure; (4) whether it may
contract; (5) whether it may sell, hold or otherwise deal in property; (6) the
state's view of the unit.1 12 These characteristics, with the exception of the
last mentioned, may be subsumed by the term "powers and duties" or
perhaps by the more limited phrase "managerial autonomy." 1 8
The Texas Approach. Despite this new approach to the problem of diversity,
many courts have still not broken with the past. Apparently this is the case in
Texas with claims arising under the Tort Claims Act. 11 4 At present, there is
only one reported case in Texas on the question of whether a certain
governmental unit, when sued under the Tort Claims Act, is a citizen for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction." 5 This does not mean, however, that the
question is rarely encountered or that it does not present severe difficulties
for the practitioner, because invariably the question is presented in a motion
to dismiss and the order sustaining the contention, being without opinion in
most cases, will seldom be reported.
Johnson v. Texas Department of Corrections"" is the exception. In
Johnson, the decedent's widow, an Oklahoma resident, sued the department
for negligence in the crash of a TDC airplane which claimed the life of her
husband. One of the grounds urged by the department to bar the maintenance of the action was that the state was immune from suit without its
consent. However, the court said that before determining whether the state
could invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the court would 'have to
determine whether there was jurisdiction on the part of the court to hear the
suit:
A careful scrutiny of the legislative provisions establishing and maintaining the TDC, Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. arts. 6166a-6203g, reveals
that the TDC performs a basic governmental function of the State.
Thus, the TDC is merely the alter ego of the State of Texas. The State
of Texas is the real party in interest and as such cannot be a 'citizen'. .. . 117
In using the governmental function test to determine the status of the TDC
for diversity purposes the Johnson court was incorrect. Had a Texas county
been the defendant in the suit, and had "careful scrutiny" been given to state
court determinations as to the status of a county relative to the state, the
112. See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), which incorporates
most of these criteria. See also Harrison Constr. Co. v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 272
F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1959); Louisiana Highway Comm'n v. Farnsworth, 74 F.2d 910 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 729 (1935); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. State Roads Comm'n, 187
F. Supp. 766 (D. Md. 1960).
113. See cases cited at note 112 supra.

114. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
115. Johnson v. Texas Dep't of Corrections, 373 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
116. Id.

117. Id. at 1110 (emphasis added).
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court would have found that a county, like the TDC, performs basic
governmental functions. Under state law a county is said to be incapable of
performing anything but governmental functions. 118 Yet it is beyond ques-

tion that counties, whether or not viewed by the state to be separate legal
entities, are "citizens" for diversity purposes. 119 The type of reasoning found
in Johnson has apparently persisted, for units of government have met with
much success in contending they are not citizens. 120 Nevertheless, it is
1 21
significant to note that neither in Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc.,'
nor in Weaver v. Hirsty1 22 was the diversity hurdle asserted by the
defendants. Nor did the courts raise the question sua sponte, although
diversity, being subject-matter jurisdiction, must be affirmatively evidenced
and is not subject to waiver. 1 23 One further error which -results when looking
solely to state court decisions to determine the status of a unit for diversity
purposes is that the state opinions and statutes viewed will deal exclusively
with the unit in an attempt to determine whether it is to be deemed the
"state" for purposes of cloaking it with sovereign immunity. A state court
usually would not have occasion to decide whether the unit stands in such a
position relative to the state that it may be a citizen for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.12 4 But the two are entirely different questions, and different
factors must determine their answers. Significant in this area is Couch v.
Banks, 25 which, although dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction, was
dismissed on the authority of Moor v. County of Alameda.' 26
The Moor Case: A New Approach? Moor was a damage action against a
California county wherein the petitioner alleged that the county was a citizen
for diversity purposes. The respondent county acknowledged that generally
counties had been considered citizens for such purposes, but moved to
dismiss based on the ground that unlike counties of most states, it was not an
independent political subdivision, but was, under California law, nothing
more than an arm or agency of the state itself. After reviewing the numerous
duties and powers possessed by the county, the Court concluded that such
powers "strike us as persuasive indicia of the independent status occupied by
California counties relative to the State of California.' 27 Further, the Court
found a California Supreme Court opinion helpful in determining that the
county was, rather than was not, a citizen for diversity purposes.' 28 That
118. See, e.g., Harris County v. Gerhart, 115 Tex. 449, 283 S.W. 139 (1926).
119. See, e.g., Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 533-34 (1893); Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
118 (1868). In one recent case against a city, the diversity "defense" was apparently not

even raised. See Starr v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Tex. 1975).

120. Letter from John T. Richards II, Ass't Attorney General, Jan. 23, 1975.
121. 352 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
122. No. 5513 (E.D. Tex., Nov. 22, 1972).

123. See, e.g., Grace v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278 (11883); Le Mieux
Bros., Inc. v. Tremont Lumber Co., 140 F.2d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 1944).
124.

It might have occasion to view the question, however, if -the defendant seeks to

remove the action to federal court. See State v. O'Connor, 96 Tex. 484, 74 S.W. 899
(1903), aff'd, 202 U.S. 501 (1906).
125. No. 3-74-574 (N.D. Tex., Nov. 27, 1974).
126. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
127. Id. at 720.
128. Id.at 720-21.
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opinion had determined that a county of that state "is sufficiently corporate
'29
in character to justify the issuance of a writ of mandate to it.'
After Moor, the determination of whether a governmental unit is merely
an arm of the state and hence not a "citizen" is to be made by reference to
the powers and duties possessed by the unit. And while a state decision or
law might aid in a determination that the unit is a citizen, state authority
which maintains that it is not more ,than an arm of the state will seemingly
carry little weight. Hopefully, the test that will eventually be derived from
Moor to determine if a unit is a citizen is whether the unit of government has
a sufficiently recognizeable and independent status relative to the state in
general so that the unit may properly be so classified. In other words, the
unit must be recognizable in the sense that one would view it as being a body
different from what is commonly referred to as the state, and independent in
the sense that it is a body which substantially manages its own affairs.
III.

AN ILLUSTRATION

To put the various problems in focus, an illustration should prove helpful.
Suppose A, a resident of Michigan, is traveling in Texas along a highway
under construction. Ahead of him is a motorcyclist, who, when attempting to

round a curve constructed to detour traffic, hits a patch of ice in the
roadway, loses control, and tumbles to the pavement. To avoid hitting the
cyclist, A applies his brakes and turns the wheel, at which time he too makes

contact with the ice patch, which causes him to lose control of the tractortrailer rig he is operating. The ensuing accident results in severe personal
injury to A and his truck is completely destroyed. Later it is found that the
ice standing in the roadway was caused by a trench dug alongside the road for
the purpose of allowing the water to drain onto and across the roadway.
Potential defendants are the Texas Highway Department, the construction
contractor, and the adjacent landowner. A files suit against all three in
federal district court. By virtue13 0of the Texas Tort Claims Act the highway
department is amenable to suit.

Prior to the day that answer is due, A's attorney receives a copy of the
department's motion to dismiss, based on the grounds that the state has not
waived immunity from suit in federal court and that the Texas Highway

Department is not a "citizen" for diversity purposes because it is merely the
129. People ex rel. Younger v. County of Eldorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 491 n.12, 487 P.2d
1193, 1199 n.12, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 559 n.12 (1971). However, it seems apparent that
the fact that the unit in question is not a corporation is not controlling. Hunkin-Conkey
Constr. Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 34 F. Supp. 26 (M.D. Pa. 1940). The
decision in the Moor case that Alameda County was a "citizen" for diversity purposes

was reached by the Court before incidentally noting how counties of the state have been
characterized by the state courts. It should be noted that this holding in Moor runs the

risk of being overshadowed by another issue raised in the case, namely whether the
county was a suable "person" under the Civil Rights Act of 1877, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). In concluding that it was not, the Court relied on its earlier decision in Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The issue in Moor on whether the county was a "citizen"
for diversity purposes arose under a separate claim in the case based on state law.
130. The fact situation is taken from Couch v. Banks, No. 3-74-574 (N.D. Tex., Nov.
27, 1974).
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arm or alter ego of the state. While countering the first contention may pose
problems, it should not prove as difficult as overcoming the second. In the
first place, the weight of authority 1 81 holds that the Texas Tort Claims Act
effects a complete waiver as regards forum. More importantly, however, the
8 2 combined
rationale of Flores,1
with that of Lester,l 88 is sound, or at least
8 4
is far more convincing than the sole case to the contrary.
The diversity problem will provide the major barrier to the maintenance
of A's action, because it is here that his attorney must show that the highway
department is a citizen.' 8 5 To show this he must convince the court that the
department occupies an independent status, or possesses a sufficiently recognizable character, relative to the state in general, by way of setting forth its
various powers and duties. As an initial measure, A's attorney may contend
that the department has "indirectly" become a citizen in that it has been
given the power to join in suit "at any time for all purposes, including the
right of appeal at any stage .

. .

."13

It may be sued for certain of its

torts' 7 and may be made to respond in damages when it injures property
while constructing a highway.' 38 It has the authority to enter into contracts, 8 9 and may be subject to suit thereon. 40 Additionally, the department has broad control over funds by virtue of various statutory provisions, 14 ' and the courts of Texas have held that the department has
supervision over the expenditure of highway funds with the state treasury
merely holding them at the department's will. 142 Perhaps very significantly,
the department and the department alone must answer for any liability it
incurs as the result of its tortious activity, 48 and to cover such potential
liability it is authorized to carry insurance. 44
131. The weight of authority is comprised of two cases, Flores v. Norton &Ramsey
Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Tex. 1972), discussed in 4he text accompanying
notes 35-38, 43-46 supra, and Lester v. County of Terry, 353 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Tex.

1973), affd, 491 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1974), discussed in the text accompanying notes 3942 supra.
132. Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
133. Lester v. County of Terry, 353 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Tex. 1973), af 'd, 491 F.2d
975 (5th Cir. 1974).
134. Weaver v. Hirsty, No. 5513 (E.D. Tex., Nov. 22, 1972).
135. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
136. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6673e-1 (Supp. 1975).
137. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
138. Wichita Falls v. Real Estate Trust, 135 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
139. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 6673e-2, 6674d-1, and 6674t (1969).
140. TEx. REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 66741 (1969).
141. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 6673e-2, 6674d-1, and 6674e (1969).
142. Texas Co. v. Schriewer, 38 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. CiV. App.-Waco 1931), modified
in other respects sub nom.Smith v. Texas Co., 53 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932,
holding approved). The department may acquire, hold and otherwise deal in property.
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 6673e-1, 6674q-u, w (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
143. TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN.art. 6252-19, §§ 9-11 (1970).
144. Id. See also TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6674s-I (Supp. 1975). The
department may carry insurance. See Interoffice Communication, attached as exhibit
"H" to SENATE INTERIM COMM., 62D LEoISLATURE oiFTEXAs, REPORT ON THE TEXAS
TORT CLAIMS AcT A-44 (1971); see Smith, Insurance and the Texas Tort Claims Act, 49
TEXAS L. REV. 445 (1971).
Although the illustration in the text consistently refers to the Texas Highway Department, the agency's name has recently been changed to the State Department of
Highways and Public Transportation, upon its merger with the Texas Mass Transportation Commission. Ch. 678, § 3, [1975] Tex. Laws Reg. Sess. 2063, amending, TEx.
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There is yet another approach that A's attorney might take to show that
the department is a citizen for diversity jurisdiction purposes, one which may
be termed the "direct" approach to a citizen status. This is based upon the
simple proposition that the department has been imbued with such a status
for the purpose of suit. This conclusion derives from a reading of certain
sections of the Tort Claims Act. Section 3 provides, in pertinent part: "Each
unit of government in the state shall be liable for money damages . . .
where such unit of government, if a private person, would be liable
....
"145 Section 19 of the Act is also significant in this respect by
providing that "Any governmental unit carrying Workmen's Compensation
Insurance . . . shall be entitled to all of the privileges and immunities
granted by the . . . Act . . . to private persons and corporations.' 48 Of

course, the courts of the state have recognized that once the state or its
governmental units are involved in litigation they are regarded as private
47
individuals.
One might argue that to allow the legislature to give units of government a
citizen status for diversity purposes runs counter to the notion that federal
subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties.
However, it is contended that such an analysis presents itself too easily.
Accepting, ad arguendo, that parties may not manipulate diversity jurisdiction requirements, 148 it would nevertheless seem consistent to say that if the
legislature may give the department sufficient powers so that at some
recognizable point it becomes a citizen for diversity purposes (the "indirect"
approach to becoming a citizen), it may just as well say that the department
is to be deemed a citizen for purposes of suit (the "direct" approach to
becoming a citizen). Further, it is doubtful whether the courts have considered situations such as this when stating that one cannot confer diversity
jurisdiction by consent. In reality, the problem is not too different from the
situation where two citizens, both residents of the same state, are about to
engage in a legal battle, and the prospective plaintiff makes a bona fide
move to another state and files the action based on diversity. 1 49 The analogy
is closer still to the corporate situation where before corporate existence the
nonentity necessarily could not be a citizen for diversity purposes, but once
incorporated is deemed to be a citizen. 50° The problem is simply one of
removal of a disability. While one may not confer diversity jurisdiction upon
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6663 (1969).

Thus, in addition to the powers possessed by
the former highway department, the newly created DHPT now has the powers of the
former mass transit commission as well. Ch. 678, §§ 1, 2, [1975] Tex. Laws Reg. Sess.
2062-63. Accordingly, there has been a special Public Transportation Fund established

for the exclusive use of the merged agencies in carrying out the goals of public trans-

portation. Ch. 679, § 5, [1975] Tex. Laws Reg. Sess. 2067.

145. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Supp. 1975), amending Tx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (1970) (emphasis added).
146. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 19 (1970) (emphasis added).
147. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
148. The notion that the parties may not manipulate jurisdictional requirements has
been challenged as not absolute. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.6, at 537 (1965).
149. Cf. Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1962).
150. See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 106 (1898); Louisville, C. & C.
R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558-59 (1844).
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himself when not possessing a citizen status,' 5 ' none would argue that he
may not remove those disabilities which keep him from obtaining that status.
Nor should it make a difference that the geographical boundaries of the unit
involved in the action, such as those of the Texas Highway Department, are
co-extensive with those of the state itself, no such distinction being perceived
in the cases.

It should be noted that this latter argument regarding the approach to take
when showing citizen status is applicable to any governmental unit suable
under the Tort Claims Act, while the former approach, at least in regard to
those statutory provisions it relies on, deals only with the Texas Highway
Department. 1 52 If these arguments are employed, and the court takes the
58
time to review the authorities, with particular reference to the Moor case,
A should be successful in withstanding the department's motion to dismiss.54

IV.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an unnecessarily harsh and arbitrary one' 55 which undoubtedly "runs counter to democratic notions of the
moral responsibility of the State."'u5 Recognizing this, many states have
acted to relieve the doctrine of its vitality. The Texas Legislature did so by
enacting the Texas Tort Claims Act in 1969.1 5 7 Yet even though this waiver

of immunity has put most victims of governmental tort in a better position
than they were prior to the passage of the Act, a plaintiff, when seeking to
vindicate his rights in a federal tribunal on the jurisdictional basis of diversity
of citizenship, may still find his way barred. By strictly construing the Act as
not to permit suit in the federal arena because of failure of the state to waive
immunity in federal tribunals, a court surely acts in an out-dated manner,
while at the same time ignoring the express intention of a legislature that
called for the Act to be liberally construed. Fortunately, the problem of
scope of waiver as regards forum may no longer be a great obstacle, due to
the well-reasoned opinion of the Flores case.' 58 But even with the question
151. See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
152. Thus, one must consult the proper statute dealing with the particular unit
involved in order to determine its powers, duties and degree of autonomy.
153. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
154. As has been pointed out, supra note 130 and accompanying text, the case from
which the fact situation was taken was dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction on the
authority of Moor. Letter from Judge Win. M. Taylor, Nov. 14, 1974, to counsel of
record in Couch v. Banks, No. 3-74-574 (N.D. Tex., Nov. 27, 1974). It is contended that
the case was wrongly decided. The suit was not pursued in the federal arena, but was
refiled in state court. No. 34,352, Dist. Ct. of Hunt County, 196th Judicial Dist. of
Texas, Jan. 16, 1975. One favorable consequence of the ruling, however, was that it
recognized the Moor criteria as being applicable in the determination of the diversity
question, rather ithan the antiquated test that had been employed in the previous Texas
case of Johnson v. Texas Dep't of Corrections, 373 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D. Tex. 1974),
discussed at notes 116-19 supra and accompanying text.
155. Greenhill & Murto, supra note 13, at 472.
156. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
157. TEx. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
158. Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
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of forum no longer a major hurdle, another factor may yet impede the
diverse plaintiff, namely the proposition that a state and its units which are
said to be its arms or alter egos are not "citizens" for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. Application of nebulous tests in a zeal for formalism to determine the issue does not outweigh the negative consequences which flow from
a conclusion that a governmental unit is not a "citizen": deprivation of a
plaintiff's choice of forum and the protection his choice should be accorded,
and the multiplicity of actions that will inevitably result. The Moor case may
signal a new era for determination of the status of governmental units, but
this is by no means certain. The better view, however, is that a unit of
government is a citizen either when it has been outrightly deemed to be so by
the legislature, or when, in cases where it is not, it may be said to possess a
sufficiently recognizable and independent character relative to the state in
general, coupled with some degree of fiscal or managerial autonomy. When
counties and municipalities are perceived as citizens for diversity purposes,
no valid reason suggests itself why an agency such as the Texas Highway
Department may not also be so perceived. Outmoded doctrines of construction, and especially those which can be spoken of only in the abstract, should
not be employed to effect what is merely a substitute on the federal level for
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

